Abstract. Let G = (A ∪ B, E) be an instance of the stable marriage problem where every vertex ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference. A matching M in G is popular if M does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching N . That is, φ(M, N ) ≥ φ(N, M ) where φ(M, N ) (similarly, φ(N, M )) is the number of votes for M (resp., N ) in the M -vs-N election. Popular matchings are a wellstudied generalization of stable matchings, introduced with the goal of enlarging the set of admissible solutions, while maintaining a certain level of fairness. Stable matchings are, in fact, popular matchings of minimum size. Unfortunately, unlike in the case of stable matchings, it is NP-hard to find a popular matching of minimum cost, when a linear cost function is given on the edge set -even worse, the min-cost popular matching problem is hard to approximate up to any factor. The goal of this paper is to obtain efficient algorithms for computing desirable matchings (wrt cost) by paying the price of mildly relaxing popularity. Call a matching M quasi-popular if φ(M, N ) ≥ φ(N, M )/2 for every matching N . Our main positive result is a bi-criteria algorithm that finds in polynomial time a quasi-popular matching of cost at most opt, where opt is the cost of a min-cost popular matching. Key to the algorithm are a number of results for certain polytopes related to matchings and that we believe to be of independent interest. In particular, we give a polynomial-size extended formulation for an integral polytope sandwiched between the popular and quasi-popular matching polytopes. We complement these results by showing that it is NP-hard to find a quasi-popular matching of minimum cost, and that both the popular and quasi-popular matching polytopes have near-exponential extension complexity.
Introduction
Consider a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B, E) on n vertices and m edges where every vertex ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference. Such an instance, commonly referred to as a marriage instance, is a classical model in two-sided matching markets. A matching M is stable if there is no blocking pair with respect to M : a pair (a, b) blocks M if both a and b prefer each other to their respective assignments in M . The notion of stability was introduced by Gale and Shapley [14] in 1962 who showed that stable matchings always exist in G and can be efficiently computed.
A broad class of objectives can be captured by defining a function cost : E → R and asking for the stable matching whose sum of edge costs is minimized. Thus the min-cost stable matching problem includes several stable matching problems such as finding one with max-utility or with min-regret, or one with given forced and forbidden edges. More generally, a cost function allows a decision-maker to "access" the whole family of stable matchings (possibly of exponential size), while the Gale-Shapley algorithm will always return the same stable matching (i.e., the one that is optimal for one side of the bipartition). There are several polynomial time algorithms to compute a min-cost stable matching and special variants of this problem [12, 13, 25, 35, 38, 40] .
Stable matchings and their extensions are used in many optimization problems in computer science, economics, and operations research: these include matching students to schools/colleges [2, 39] and medical interns to hospitals [5, 32] . Stability is a very strict condition and there are applications where stability may be relaxed to a weaker notion than simply forbidding any blocking pair, so as to achieve a matching with an improved cost. Such a matching may achieve more social good.
Work done while visiting Max-Planck-Institut für Informatik, Saarbrücken, Germany. For instance, all stable matchings have the same size [15] which may be only half the size of a max-size matching in G-while matching students to schools/colleges or medical interns to hospitals, one seeks larger matchings. It has been noted [33, 34] that rural hospitals frequently face the problem of being understaffed with residents by the National Resident Matching Program in the USA. On the other hand, one does not want to simply ignore vertex preferences and impose a max-size matching in the given instance as such a matching may be highly unstable with respect to choices expressed by the vertices. Thus what we seek is a weaker notion of stability that captures "global stability" and achieves more social good, i.e., it achieves a better value (than the best stable matching) with respect to the given cost function.
A relaxation. A natural relaxation of stability is popularity. Consider an election between two matchings M and N : here each vertex casts a vote for the matching in {M, N } where it gets assigned a more preferred partner (being left unmatched is its least preferred state) and it abstains from voting if its assignment is the same in M and N . Let φ(M, N ) (similarly, φ(N, M )) be the number of votes for M (resp., N ) in this election. We say N is more popular than M if φ(N, M ) > φ(M, N ).
Definition 1.
A matching M is popular if there is no matching in G that is more popular than M , i.e., φ(M, N ) ≥ φ(N, M ) for all matchings N in G.
Thus a popular matching never loses a head-to-head election against any matching. In other words, it is a weak Condorcet winner [6, 7] in the voting instance where matchings are the candidates and vertices are voters. Hence a popular matching can be regarded as a globally stable matching as no election can force a migration from a popular matching to some other matching. The notion of popularity was introduced by Gärdenfors [16] in 1975 who showed that every stable matching is popular; in fact, every stable matching is a min-size popular matching [22] . Thus, we can obtain larger matchings by relaxing stability to popularity. There are efficient algorithms to compute a max-size popular matching [22, 27] in G = (A ∪ B, E) and the size of a max-size popular matching is at least 2|M max |/3, where M max is a max-size matching in G. Though computing a min-size (similarly, max-size) popular matching is easy, computing a min-cost popular matching in G = (A ∪ B, E) is NP-hard [11] ; moreover, it was shown in [11] that it is NP-hard to approximate to any factor c even in the restricted case when every edge has cost 0 or 1. A further relaxation. Though popularity is a natural notion of global stability and a min-cost popular matching is "better" than a min-cost stable matching, the fact that it is NP-hard to even approximate a mincost popular matching represents a computational barrier. In this paper, we circumvent this by introducing and studying a further relaxation: rather than ask for a popular matching whose cost is near-optimal, let us ask for a near-popular matching whose cost is at most opt, where opt is the cost of a min-cost popular matching. In order to formalize near-popularity, we need to define the unpopularity factor of M , denoted by u(M ) [31] :
where M(G) is the set of matchings in G. Thus in an election between M and any other matching, the ratio |{vertices against M }|/|{vertices for M }| is bounded from above by u(M ). Note that u(M ) ∈ Q ≥0 ∪ {∞}.
Thus the function unpopularity factor on M(G), when it is not ∞, captures the gamut of different matchings M in G that are Pareto-optimal, i.e., such that there is no matching (other than M ) where every vertex is matched to a partner at least as good as in M . In fact, a matching M is popular iff u(M ) ≤ 1, while a matching M is Pareto-optimal iff u(M ) < ∞.
Observe that no matching wins more than 1/2-fraction of the votes cast in its head-to-head election against a popular matching. Similarly, no matching wins more than 2/3-fraction of the votes cast in its head-to-head election against a matching with unpopularity factor at most 2. Thus a matching with a small unpopularity factor is, in a way, close to being popular. In particular, in this paper we consider matchings with unpopularity factor bounded by 2.
Definition 2. A matching M in G = (A ∪ B, E) is quasi-popular if u(M ) ≤ 2.
Summarizing, for the sake of efficiency in computation, when comparing two matchings, we are ready to relax never losing (the definition of popular matchings) to losing within a factor bounded by 2 (the definition of quasi-popularity). Note that if we scale the votes in favor of M by 2, then a quasi-popular matching M never loses an election. We show that relaxing popularity to quasi-popularity allows us to design efficient algorithms for finding desired matchings in G.
Our results and techniques
Theorem 1. Given a marriage instance G = (A ∪ B, E) with a function cost : E → R, there is a polynomial time algorithm to compute a quasi-popular matching M such that cost(M ) ≤ opt, where opt is the cost of a min-cost popular matching in G.
Analogous to the min-cost stable matching problem, the min-cost popular matching problem is a generic problem that captures many variants of the optimal popular matching problem such as the max-utility popular matching problem and the popular matching problem with given forced and forbidden edges. In fact, these popular matching problems are NP-hard [11, 29] and the above result shows that we can efficiently obtain a quasi-popular matching that is at least as good as the best popular matching as per our optimality criterion.
Our approach to prove Theorem 1 is as follows. Let M 1 (respectively, M 2 ) be the set of popular (resp., quasi-popular) matchings in G. We will show a set M * such that (1) M 1 ⊆ M * ⊆ M 2 and (2) conv(M * ) admits a formulation F of size O(m + n) in R m+n , where conv(M * ) is the convex hull of characteristic vectors of matchings in M * . Linear programming over F yields Theorem 1. The high-level idea of our construction of M * and formulation F is as follows: we show that every popular matching in G can be extended to become a "special" matching (see Definition 4) in a supergraph G * = (A∪B, E * ) of G. Moreover, projecting any special matching in G * to G yields a quasi-popular matching in G. The set of such quasi-popular matchings is M * . We show that the convex hull of special matchings in G * admits a compact extended formulation as a face F of a new compact extended formulation of the dominant matching polytope of G * .
Definition 3. A popular matching
Clearly, every dominant matching is a max-size popular matching. Dominant matchings always exist in a marriage instance G [22] . Note that a popular matching M is stable if and only if M defeats every smaller matching. Thus dominant matchings can be considered to be the counterpart of stable matchings: the role occupied by dominant matchings in the set of max-size popular matchings is analogous to the role played by stable matchings in the set of min-size popular matchings. Moreover, dominant matchings coincide with the linear image of stable matchings in a related bipartite graph G on n vertices and 2m edges [10, 11] .
We show that the dominant matching polytope D G of any marriage instance G admits a formulation of
(as the linear image of the stable matching polytope of G ) was previously known [10] . Although dominant matchings are the linear image of stable matchings and have a compact extended formulation, we show that unlike stable matchings whose polytope in R m has a linear number of facets [40, 35] , the dominant matching polytope does not admit a polynomialsize description in R m . In fact, a complete linear description of the dominant matching polytope in the original space was not known so far. We give one here, and show that the dominant matching polytope has an exponential number of facets (in the size of the graph). Recall that M(G) is the set of matchings in G = (A ∪ B, E). Since we are willing to allow the relaxations stability → popularity → quasi-popularity for the sake of optimality (wrt cost) and efficient computation, the next natural question is the complexity of computing a min-cost quasi-popular matching in G = (A ∪ B, E). In order to answer this question, we first delve into the structure of quasi-popular matchings. Stable matchings (by definition) and popular matchings (see [22] ) have simple forbidden structures in terms of blocking edges-to come up with such forbidden structures for quasi-popular matchings is much more complex.
Hence, we do not pursue this combinatorial approach. Instead, we extend the LP-method used for popular fractional matchings [24, 26, 28] to design an appropriate dual certificate or witness (a vector in R n : see Section 2 for details) for quasi-popularity. We show that a matching is quasi-popular iff it has a witness in {0, ±1, ±2}
n . This fact allows us to deduce the following.
Theorem 3. Given a marriage instance G = (A ∪ B, E) with a function cost : E → {0, 1}, it is NP-hard to compute a min-cost quasi-popular matching in G. Moreover, it is NP-hard to approximate it within any multiplicative factor.
It is a natural question whether the positive/negative results on popular and quasi-popular matchings are mirrored by the sizes of the descriptions of the associated polytopes. Let P (respectively, Q) be the popular (resp., quasi-popular) matching polytope of G. We show that both P and Q have near-exponential extension complexity (see Section 6 for definitions). This is proved by showing that a certain face of P (resp. Q) is an extension of certain independent set polytopes for which a lower bound on the extension complexity is known [18] .
Theorem 4.
The extension complexity of the polytope P and of the polytope Q is 2
The proof of Theorem 1 shows therefore that conv(M * ) is an "easy-to-describe" integral polytope sandwiched between two hard ones. Interestingly, formulation F has a linear number of constraints, hence conv(M * ) is, in a way, the "easiest" polytope sandwiched between P and Q.
Background and Related results
Algorithmic questions for popular matchings were first studied in the one-sided preferences model, where it is only vertices in A that have preferences over their neighbors and cast votes (vertices in B are objects). Popular matchings need not exist here and an efficient algorithm was given in [1] to determine if an instance admits a popular matching or not. McCutchen [31] introduced the measure of unpopularity factor and showed that computing a matching with least unpopularity factor in the one-sided preferences model is NP-hard. When vertices on both sides have strict preferences, i.e., in a marriage instance, stable matchings always exist and hence popular matchings always exist. As mentioned earlier, efficient algorithms are known to compute max-size popular matchings [22, 27] . These matchings compute dominant matchings (see Definition 3). A linear time algorithm was given in [10] to decide if G has a popular matching with a given edge e: it was shown that it was enough to check if there was either a stable matching or a dominant matching with the edge e.
A compact extended formulation of the popular fractional matching polytope in the one-sided preferences model was given in [26] , where it was used to show that popular mixed matchings always exist and can be computed in polynomial time. This formulation was extended to the two-sided preferences model in [28] and analyzed in [24] where the half-integrality of the popular fractional matching polytope was shown.
The following size-unpopularity factor trade-off in a marriage instance G = (A ∪ B, E) was shown in [27] : for any k ≥ 2, there exists a matching
Matchings with low unpopularity factor in dynamic matching markets were studied in [4] where it was shown that O(∆)-unpopularity factor matchings can be maintained by making O(∆) changes per round to the current matching, where ∆ is the max-degree in the graph. This holds in both one-sided and two-sided preference models and also in the roommates model where the graph G need not be bipartite. Popular matchings need not exist in a roommates instance G and it was shown in [23] that G always admits a matching with unpopularity factor O(log n) and there are indeed instances where every matching has unpopularity factor Ω(log n).
Hardness results. It was recently shown [11, 19] that it is NP-hard to decide if a roommates instance admits a popular matching or not. Several hardness results for popular matchings in a marriage instance G were shown in [11] : these include (i) the hardness of deciding if G admits a popular matching that is neither a stable nor a dominant matching and (ii) the hardness of deciding if G admits a popular matching that contains/forbids two given edges e and e .
It was shown in [29] that it is NP-hard to compute a max-utility popular matching when edge utilities are non-negative-this problem admits a 2-approximation and it is NP-hard to approximate it to a better factor [11] . Several hardness results for stable/popular matchings were shown in [9] : these include deciding if G admits a popular matching that is not dominant and if G has a stable matching that is also dominant.
Bi-criteria approximation. Using the notation of bi-criteria approximation algorithms (see e.g. [30] ), our algorithm (from Theorem 1) is a (1, 2) approximation for the min-cost popular matching problem, where the first entry denotes the ratio to the cost of the min-cost popular matching, and the second the unpopularity factor. Bi-criteria approximation algorithms have been developed for e.g. bounded-degree spanning tree [17, 37] and k-means [30] problems. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that such an algorithm is proposed for a matching problem under preferences.
Polytopes and Complexity. Linear programming is a classical tool for solving combinatorial optimization problems in general, and matching problems in particular. Much research has been devoted to give complete linear descriptions (of polynomial size) for polytopes associated to those problems, or showing lower bounds on the size of any such description. Although intuitively one expects those bounds to be related to the complexity of the associated optimization problems, this is not always the case. For instance, the matching polytope [36] does not have a compact extended formulation. On the other hand, it is known [3] that there is an O( √ n)-approximated extended formulation of polynomial size for the independent set polytope of a graph on n vertices. However being able to construct it efficiently would be very surprising because of known hardness results [20] .
Organization of the paper. We discuss preliminaries in Section 2. We present the proof of Theorem 1 in Section 3. Section 4 contains the proof of Theorem 2 and a result on polytopes that is used in the proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. We prove Theorem 3 in Section 5 and Theorem 4 in Section 6. Omitted proofs and missing details are in the appendix.
Preliminaries
Our input is a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B, E) on n vertices and m edges, where each vertex ranks its neighbors is a strict preference order. We now give a brief overview of some useful known results.
A characterization of popular matchings. Given any matching M in G, for any edge (a, b) / ∈ M , define vote a (b, M ) as follows: (here M (a) is a's partner in the matching M and M (a) = null if a is unmatched)
Thus, every edge outside M has a label in {(±, ±)}, and it is labeled (+, +) if and only if it blocks M .
LetG be the graph G augmented with self-loops. That is, we assume each vertex is its own last choice neighbor. So we can henceforth regard any matching M in G as a perfect matchingM inG by adding self-loops for all vertices left unmatched in M . The following edge weight function wt M in the augmented graphG will be useful to us. For any edge (a, b) in G, define:
So wt M (e) = 0 for all e ∈ M . We need to define wt M for self-loops as well: let wt M (u, u) = 0 if u is left unmatched in M , else wt M (u, u) = −1. For any matching N in G, wt M (Ñ ) is the difference in the number of votes for N and for M in their head-to-head election, i.e., wt M (Ñ ) = φ(N, M ) − φ(M, N ). So M is popular in G if and only if every perfect matching in the graphG has weight at most 0, i.e., if and only ifM is an optimal solution to the max-weight perfect matching problem inG. The characterization given below follows from LP-duality and total unimodularity of the system. n such that u∈A∪B α u = 0,
For any popular matching M , a vector α ∈ {0, ±1} n as given in Theorem 5 will be called M 's witness. A popular matching may have several witnesses. Any stable matching M has 0 as a witness, since
Characterizations of dominant matchings. For any matching M , let G M be the graph obtained from G by removing edges labeled (−, −). Dominant matchings admit the following easy characterization.
Theorem 6 ([10]).
A popular matching M is dominant iff there is no M -augmenting path in G M .
Any maximum-size popular (hence any dominant) matching matches the same subset of vertices and in fact, a vertex left unmatched in a dominant matching has to be left unmatched in every popular matching in G [21] . Call a vertex v popular if it is matched in any max-size popular matching, else call v unpopular. Similarly, we call a vertex u stable if it is matched in some (equivalently, every [15] ) stable matching in G, else call u unstable.
It is known that every popular matching in G has to match all stable vertices [22] . It is also known that for any witness α, it has to be the case that α u = 0 for every unpopular vertex u [29] .
The following LP-based characterization of dominant matchings follows from their more elaborate combinatorial characterization [10, 11] . We include a new proof of Theorem 7 in Appendix A. The popular subgraph. Call an edge e in G = (A ∪ B, E) popular if there is some popular matching in G that contains e. Let E F be the set of popular edges in G: the subset E F ⊆ E can be computed in linear time [10] . Call F G = (A ∪ B, E F ) the popular subgraph of G.
The subgraph F G need not be connected: let C 1 , . . . , C h be the set of connected components in
The following observation will be useful.
Observation 1 For any non-trivial connected component C i in the popular subgraph F G , the number of unstable vertices in A ∩ C i equals the number of unstable vertices in B ∩ C i .
Indeed, every max-size popular matching M restricted to C i is a perfect matching, since all max-size popular matchings match the same set of vertices and vertices left unmatched in any max-size popular matching are left unmatched in all popular matchings. Thus |A ∩ C i | = |B ∩ C i |. The number of stable vertices in A ∩ C i equals the number of stable vertices in B ∩ C i , since every stable matching matches stable vertices in C i among themselves. Hence Observation 1 follows.
The following lemma and its proof will be useful to us. Its proof is included in Appendix A.
Lemma 1 ([29]
). Let C i be any connected component in the popular subgraph F G . Any popular matching M in G either matches all unstable vertices in C i or none of them.
Our algorithm
A high-level view. In this section, we prove Theorem 1. Our input instance is G = (A ∪ B, E) and without loss of generality, assume |A| ≥ |B|. The first step in our algorithm is an augmentation of the graph G into G * = (A ∪ B, E * ), with E * ⊇ E. The new edges in E * are obtained by introducing edges between certain pairs of unstable vertices and each new edge has cost 0. Given a popular matching M in G, we will use these new edges to obtain an extension M * in G * such that M * is a dominant matching in G * , see Lemma 2. Moreover, M * satisfies some stronger condition on witnesses than dominant matchings (as given in Theorem 7). Since M * satisfies some extra conditions in addition to being dominant, we will call M * an extra-dominant matching, see Definition 4. The second step of the algorithm is to prove that, for every extra-dominant matching T in G * , T ∩ E is a quasi-popular matching in G, see Lemma 3. The first two steps imply that in order to prove Theorem 1, it suffices to efficiently find a min-cost extradominant matching (in G * ). We show how to do this by providing a compact extended formulation for the extra-dominant matching polytope. In fact, we first give an extended formulation for the dominant matching polytope of any graph, and then show that one of its faces is an extended formulation for the extra-dominant matching polytope. We give a succinct description of our algorithm at the end of Section 3.3. Let C 1 , . . . , C k be the non-trivial connected components in F G . We wish to add edges in ∪ k i=1 S i to G to form the new graph G * . We will do that and in fact, we will add more edges to G * . We also consider the trivial or singleton components in F G : each such component consists of a single unpopular vertex, i.e., a vertex that is left unmatched in every popular matching. Since |A ∩ C i | = |B ∩ C i | for every non-trivial component C i and |A| ≥ |B|, there are at least as many unpopular vertices in A as in B. We compute an arbitrary pairing S 0 between unpopular vertices in A and in B. If |A| > |B| then some unpopular vertices in A are left out of S 0 .
The supergraph G * . We are now ready to define the instance G * .
-
-Preference lists of vertices in G * are the same as in G, except for unstable vertices in G, some of whom have acquired a new neighbor in G * . For any unstable vertex u with a new neighbor v in G * , the vertex v is at the tail of u's preference list, i.e., v is u's least preferred neighbor in G * .
The matching M * . Let M be any popular matching in G. Lemma 1 tells us that for any edge (a, b) ∈ ∪ k i=1 S i , either both a and b are matched in M or neither is matched in M . This is also true for (a, b) ∈ S 0 , since in this case both a and b are left unmatched in M . Define M * as follows:
It is easy to see that M * is a B-perfect matching in G * . Let U * be the set of unstable vertices in G * . So U * ⊆ A, in fact, U * ⊆ U A , where U A is the set of unstable vertices in G that are in A. Since a stable matching in G * is also a max-size matching, all popular matchings in G * match the same set of vertices: this is the set (A ∪ B) \ U * . Thus U * is the set of unpopular vertices in G * . We now define a useful subclass of dominant matchings in G * .
Definition 4. A popular matching T in G
is extra-dominant if T admits a witness α such that α v ∈ {±1} for every popular vertex v and
So every extra-dominant matching is also dominant. Dominant matchings admit an LP-based characterization (Theorem 7), however their original definition was combinatorial (Definition 3). Curiously, there does not seem to be any combinatorial interpretation for the above LP-based definition of extra-dominant matchings.
Lemma 2. For any popular matching
Proof. Since M is popular in G, it has a witness α ∈ {0, ±1} n such that u α u = 0 and (I M , α) satisfies edge covering constraints as given in Theorem 5, where I M is the characteristic vector of M . For any non-trivial connected component C i in the subgraph F G , it follows from the proof of Lemma 1 that either (i) α u = 0 for all u ∈ C i or (ii) α u ∈ {±1} for all u ∈ C i .
We will now define a witness β that proves the popularity of M * in G * . For any non-trivial connected component C i in F G do:
We will now set β-values for unpopular vertices (i.e., unpopular in G) as well. These vertices are outside ∪ k i=1 C i . For each such vertex u, we have α u = 0 since u is left unmatched in M . Now we set β b = 1 for all unpopular vertices b ∈ B and β a = −1 for all those unpopular vertices a ∈ A that have an edge incident to them in S 0 . For each unpopular vertex a ∈ A that does not appear in S 0 (so a is unmatched in M * ), we set β a = 0. It is left to check that these β-values satisfy Theorem 5. Observe first that (a,b)∈S0 (β a + β b ) = 0. For each edge (a, b) ∈ M , we have α a + α b = 0 and it is easy to see from our assignment of β-values that β a + β b = α a + α b = 0. Thus it follows that u∈A∪B β u = 0.
Edge-covering constraints. We will now show that
for all vertices u, where the function wt M * (e) was defined in Section 2. The constraints β u ≥ wt M * (u, u) for all vertices u are easy to see: either (i)
We will now show edge covering constraints hold for all edges in G * . It is easy to see that We will now show that these constraints hold for all the old edges as well, i.e., for any (a, b) ∈ E. We have α a + α b ≥ wt M (a, b) and also wt M * (a, b) = wt M (a, b). We have the following cases here:
-Suppose β a = α a . So β a = α a − 1. We have two sub-cases here.
(1) In the first sub-case,
for all (a, b) ∈ E, it again follows that the above edge covering constraint holds for all such edges
is an even number, so the constraint wt M (a, b) ≤ α a + α b is slack and we can tighten it to
In other words, we have:
Thus the edge covering constraints also hold for all (a, b) ∈ E. Hence β is a valid witness of M * 's popularity in G * .
Since M * is B-perfect and popular, it is dominant. Moreover, α a = wt M (a, a) ∈ {0, −1} for any a ∈ U A where α is any witness of M (see the proof of Lemma 1). Thus β a = −1 for every a ∈ U A \ U * . Hence M * has a desired dominant witness β, so M * is extra-dominant.
From extra-dominant in
Recall that we are given a function cost on the edges of G. All the old edges in G * , i.e., those in E, inherit their edge costs (as given by cost) from G. We will set cost(e) = 0 for every new edge e. Thus cost(e) = 0 for all e ∈ ∪ k i=0 S i . For any matching T in G * , define T to be the matching T ∩ E. Note that cost(T ) = cost(T ).
Lemma 3. For any extra-dominant matching T in G * , T is a quasi-popular matching in G.
Proof. Let N be any matching in G. Matchings N and T can be viewed as matchings in G * as well since
, where φ G * is the function φ in the graph G * . Let W be the set of unstable vertices in G that get matched along new edges (i.e., those in E * \ E) in T but are left unmatched in N .
The vertices in W used to vote for T versus N , however they are now indifferent between T and N because both T and N leave them unmatched.
unmatched in N or it was matched in T by an edge in E (since edges from E * \ E are at the end of every vertex's preference list), hence it is matched via the same edge in T .
Since both T and N are matchings in
Consider the subgraph of G * whose edges are given by T ⊕ N . Its connected components are alternating paths / cycles. We are left to show that, for each such connected component ρ,
. This concludes the proof, since summing both sides over all connected components ρ of
First let ρ be an alternating cycle. We know from the popularity of T in G * that, if we restrict to vertices of ρ, we have φ G * (T, N ) ≥ φ G * (N, T ). Every vertex in ρ is matched in N , hence ρ cannot contain any element of W . Thus T = T when restricted to ρ and so φ(T , N ) ≥ φ(N, T ) when restricted to the vertices of ρ. Now suppose ρ is an alternating path, and denote this path by p. As in the case of alternating cycles, we have φ G * (T, N ) ≥ φ G * (N, T ) restricted to the vertices of p. If p does not contain any element of W , then T and T are identical on vertices of p and so φ(T , N ) ≥ φ(N, T ) in G. So suppose one or both the endpoints of p belong to W . Case 1. Both endpoints of p are in W . If p consists of a single edge (a, b), then a, b ∈ W and these vertices are indifferent between N and T since both these matchings leave them unmatched.
where t ≥ 2, and a 1 , b t ∈ W (see Fig. 1 , left). Among the 2t vertices of p, we have:
The edges (a 1 , b 1 ) and (a t , b t ) are new edges and so neither of these edges is in T . In the election between T and N when restricted to the vertices of p, we have φ(T , N ) = t 2 − 2 ≥ t − 2 (since T loses out on the votes of a 1 and b t ) and φ(N, T ) = t 1 ≤ t (since N preserves all its t 1 votes). Thus when restricted to the 2t vertices of p, we have φ(N, T )/φ(T , N ) ≤ t/(t − 2). Note that a 1 and b t are indifferent between T and N and hence abstain from voting.
If t ≥ 4 then we have the desired bound, i.e., φ(N, T )/φ(T , N ) ≤ t/(t − 2) ≤ 2. We need to argue out the cases of t = 2 and t = 3 separately.
-Suppose t = 2. Then p = a 1 , b 1 , a 2 , b 2 and both a 1 and b 2 are in W . So their partners in T , i.e., b 1 and a 2 , are unstable vertices. However unstable vertices form an independent set in G, so (a Fig. 1 . The blue bold edges are in T while the black dashed edges are in N . In the figure on the left, both the endpoints of p are in W while in the figure on the right, exactly one endpoint of p (i.e., a2) is in W .
, where a 1 , b 1 , a 3 , b 3 are unstable vertices (see Fig. 1, left) .
The matching T is an extra-dominant matching (see Definition 4) and so it has a witness α such that α a3 = −1. We use this to show that at most 2 vertices among the 4 vertices
is a blocking edge to T . Then α b1 = α a2 = 1 and this implies that α b2 = −1: this is because
) cannot be a (−, −) edge wrt T and so (a 2 , b 1 ) cannot be a blocking edge to T . That is, this case never happens.
(ii) Hence (a 2 , b 1 ) is not a blocking edge to T and so at least one of a 2 , b 1 prefers T to N . We also know that wt T (a 3 , b 2 ) ≤ α a3 +α b2 ≤ 0 since α a3 = −1. Thus at least one of a 3 , b 2 prefers T to N . So at least 2 vertices among the 4 vertices
Case 2. Exactly one endpoint of p is in W and p has an even number of vertices. So
The edge (a t , b t ) is a new edge and so (a t , b t ) / ∈ T . In the election between T and N when restricted to these 2t vertices, we have φ(N, T ) = t 1 ≤ t (since N preserves all its t 1 votes from p) and φ(T , N ) = t 2 − 1 ≥ t − 1 votes (since T gets all the votes in favor of T other than b t 's vote). Thus when restricted to these 2t vertices, we have φ(N, T )/φ(T , N ) ≤ t/(t − 1) ≤ 2 since t ≥ 2.
Case 3. Exactly one endpoint of p is in W and p has an odd number of vertices, i.e., let p = a 0 , b 1 , a 1 , . . . , a t , where (a i , b i ) ∈ T and a t ∈ W (see Fig. 1, right) . Among the 2t + 1 vertices in p, we have:
Again, the edge (a t , b t ) is a new edge and so (a t , b t ) / ∈ T . In the election between T and N when restricted to these 2t + 1 vertices, we have φ(T , N ) = t 2 − 1 ≥ t (since T gets all the votes in favor of T other than a t 's vote) while φ(N, T ) = t 1 ≤ t. Thus when restricted to these 2t + 1 vertices, we have φ(N, T ) ≤ t ≤ φ(T , N ).
Extended formulations of the dominant and extra-dominant matching polytopes
We will now show extended formulations of the dominant and extra-dominant matching polytopes of G * . For any fractional matching x in G * , we will use the following edge weight function c x in
where for any edge (u, v), {v : v ≺ u v} is the set of neighbors of u ranked worse than v and {v : v u v} is the set of neighbors of u ranked better than v.
Thus c x (a, b) is the sum of fractional votes of a and b for each other versus their respective assignments in x. The first term is a's fractional vote for b versus its assignment in x and the second term is b's fractional vote for a versus its assignment in x. Observe that c x is an affine function of x.
Let E * D denote the set of dominant edges in G * . The set of dominant edges in any marriage instance can be determined in linear time [10] . Consider the polytope F defined by constraints in (1)- (5) given below. Here δ * (u) is the set of edges incident to vertex u in G * .
We will prove the following theorem in the next section. Thus linear programming on F gives us a min-cost extra-dominant matching in G * . This proves Theorem 1 stated in Section 1.
Theorem 8. The polytope F defined by (1)- (5) is an extended formulation of the extra-dominant matching polytope of G * .
Let C be the polytope defined by all the constraints in (1)- (5) other than α a = −1 for all a ∈ U A \U * : these are the rightmost constraints in (3). We will show the following result. This will help us prove Theorem 8. The proofs of Theorem 8 and Theorem 9 are given in Section 4.2.
Theorem 9. The polytope C is an extended formulation of the dominant matching polytope of G * . Moreover, C is an integral polytope.
We remark that Theorem 9 holds for any marriage instance G = (A ∪ B, E) with E replacing E * , the set of dominant edges in G replacing E * D , the set of unpopular vertices in G replacing U * , and δ(u) replacing δ * (u) for all popular vertices u. Note that G * has a special structure since U * ⊆ A. The proof of Theorem 9 does not need this special structure.
We sum up our algorithm that proves Theorem 1 below. 1 . Identify all unstable vertices in G = (A ∪ B, E) by running the Gale-Shapley algorithm. 2 . Determine the popular subgraph of G by computing all popular edges in G using [10] . 3 . Augment the graph G into the graph G * by adding edges in ∪ k i=0 S i as described in Section 3.1. 4 . Compute a min-cost extra-dominant matching T in G * by solving a linear program over F.
Return T ∩ E.
It follows from Lemma 2, Lemma 3, and Theorem 8 that T is a quasi-popular matching such that cost(T ) ≤ opt where T = T ∩ E and opt is the cost of a min-cost popular matching in G.
The dominant matching polytope
In this section, we prove Theorem 2, Theorem 8, and Theorem 9. We will first assume Theorem 9, and show how can we deduce from this a formulation of the dominant matching polytope in R m . This settles the upper bound given in Theorem 2. In Section 4.1 we settle the lower bound given in Theorem 2. We will then prove Theorem 9, and Theorem 8 will follow from this result.
Recall that all dominant matchings in G match the same subset of vertices (see Section 2). Let U ⊆ A ∪ B be the set of unpopular vertices in G: so every vertex in U is left unmatched in any dominant matching in G.
Note that U has to be an independent set in G. Let E D ⊆ E be the set of dominant edges in G, i.e., e ∈ E D if there is a dominant matching in G with the edge e.
Suppose x ∈ R m is a convex combination of dominant matchings. Then we have:
x e = 1 ∀u ∈ (A ∪ B) \ U, x e ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E D , and
For any matching M in G, let k M ≥ 0 be the number of vertices in U that are matched in M . Consider the following family of constraints:
where we define ∆(M, x) to be the sum of (fractional)
is a linear function of x. Thus the set X G ⊂ R m of points that satisfy the constraints in (6) and (7) is a polytope. We will now prove that X G is the convex hull of dominant matchings in G. The starting point is the fact that there is an efficient separation oracle for the constraints that define X G . Given a point x that satisfies the constraints in (6), we can efficiently determine if x satisfies all the constraints in (7) by solving the max-weight perfect matching problem in the graphG (this is G augmented with self-loops) with the edge weight function c x .
This function c x is exactly the same as given at the beginning of Section 3.3. This definition holds for all edges in G and we extend it self-loops as c x (u, u) = 0 for u ∈ U and c x (u, u) = −1 for u / ∈ U . Note that c x is an affine function of x. 
Consider the max-weight perfect matching LP inG = (A ∪ B,Ẽ) with respect to c x : this is LP1 given below in variables y e for e ∈Ẽ. The linear program LP2 in variables α u for u ∈ A ∪ B is the dual of LP1. So x ∈ R m that satisfies the constraints in (6) also satisfies the constraints in (7) if and only if the optimal solution of LP1 is 0, equivalently, if and only if the optimal solution of LP2 is 0; thus x ∈ X G if and only if there exists a dual feasible α ∈ R n such that u∈A∪B α u = 0. Hence X G has the following compact extended formulation:
u∈A∪B α u = 0 and
x e ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E D and
Let Z G be the polytope described by constraints (8)-(10). We will show that Z G is an extended formulation of the dominant matching polytope D G . Thus X G is the same as D G . Recall that Theorem 9 stated that other than the constraints α a = −1 for all a ∈ U A \ U * , constraints (1)- (5) (with E replacing E * , E D replacing E * D , δ replacing δ * , and U replacing U * ) define an extended formulation C (for clarity, let us call it C G ) of
Proof. Consider any point (x, α) ∈ C G . Since x does not use any edge incident to any vertex in U , we have c x (x) = ∆(x, x) = 0. Also x e = 0 for all e / ∈ E D and α u = 0 for all u ∈ U . Thus:
Conversely, consider any point (x, α) ∈ Z G . Since u∈A∪B α u = 0, α is an optimal solution to LP2. Observe that any dominant matching is an optimal solution to LP1. Hence it follows from complementary slackness that α a + α b = c x (a, b) for every dominant edge (a, b). Also, again by complementary slackness we have α u = 0 for all u ∈ U since every dominant matching, as a perfect matching inG, includes the self-loop (u, u) for u ∈ U . Thus C G ⊇ Z G . This proves the lemma.
A lower bound on the number of facets of the dominant matching polytope
We will now prove the second part of Theorem 2, i.e., the dominant matching polytope D G has Ω(c m ) facets, for some constant c > 1. For any even k, consider the 2SAT formula ψ defined as:
Observe that ψ has 2 k/2 feasible or satisfying assignments, and in particular, for each satisfying assignment, there is exactly one literal in each clause that makes the clause true. We can associate to ψ a marriage instance 3 G with |E(G)| = Θ(k) such that (recall that G S is G with edges labeled (−, −) wrt S deleted):
(a) for each satisfying assignment to ψ, there is a distinct non-dominant stable matching S of G, (b) G S has exactly one S-augmenting path ρ S , and (c) all the augmenting paths ρ S are distinct.
Call the family of all these stable, non-dominant matchings S. Moreover,
For S ∈ S, let M S be the set of matchings M such that M ⊇ (ρ S \ S). We claim that S satisfies ∆(N, S) ≤ −k N for all matchings N / ∈ M S , where ∆(N, S) = ∆(N, x), with x being the characteristic vector of matching S. Indeed, take N / ∈ M S and let e ∈ (ρ S \ S) \ N . Let G e be the instance obtained from G by removing e. Note that S, N are matchings of G e , and S is clearly popular, since it is stable (hence popular) in G. There is no S-augmenting path in G e S , since ρ S was the only S-augmenting path in G S . Hence, from Theorem 6 we conclude that S is dominant in G e . That is, S ∈ D G e and the value k N is the same in both G and G e . Hence ∆(N, S) ≤ −k N . Since S / ∈ D G , there must be some inequality from (6) or (7) that is not satisfied by (the characteristic vector of) S. One easily checks that S satisfies all inequalities from (6). Hence, S must be cut off by an inequality ∆(M, S) ≤ −k M for some M ∈ M S . Thus, in any minimal system contained in (6)-(7), at least one inequality ∆(M, S) ≤ −k M for some M ∈ M S is present.
Since M S ∩ M S = ∅ for S = S in S (from (d)), any such minimal system contains at least |S| = 2 k/2 = 2 Θ(k) inequalities. Theorem 2 then follows from the fact that inequalities in a minimal system are in one-to-one correspondence with the facets of the polyhedron they describe, see e.g. [8, Theorem 3.30 ].
A compact extended formulation of the dominant matching polytope
We will now prove Theorem 9. Theorem 8 will be a simple consequence of this result. The description of polytope C is similar to an extended formulation of the popular fractional matching polytope: the linear program that gives rise to this formulation is self-dual and this self-duality was used in [24] to show the half-integrality of the popular fractional matching polytope. While this polytope need not be integral even for complete bipartite graphs, the polytope C is integral as we show below.
For any dominant matching M , let us call a witness β ∈ {0, ±1} n a dominant witness of M if β u ∈ {±1} for every popular vertex u. We know from Theorem 7 that every dominant matching has such a witness. We are now ready to prove Theorem 9.
Proof of Theorem 9. We proceed as follows. Let (x, α) ∈ C. We first show that (x, α) is the convex combination of points (
Mi is the characteristic vector of a matching M i in G * and f i ∈ {0, ±1} n . We then show that each M i is a dominant matching in G * and f i is its dominant witness. Last, we show that for every dominant matching M and its dominant witness β, (I M , β) ∈ C. In particular, (I Mi , f i ) ∈ C for each i ∈ {0, . . . , d}, concluding the proof.
The initial part of this proof that constructs matchings M 0 , . . . , M d is from [24] . The new part begins with the definition of dominant witnesses f 0 , . . 
. , f d (after Claim 2).
Suppose (x, α) ∈ C. A useful observation is that −1 ≤ α u ≤ 1 for all u ∈ A ∪ B. The lower bound is given in constraint (3) and the upper bound can be shown as follows. Let v be u's least preferred neighbor such that the edge (u, v) has positive support in x. Then c x (u, v) ≤ 0: this is because u's vote for v versus its assignment in x is x uv − 1 while v's vote for u versus its assignment in x is at most 1 − x uv . We have (u, v) ∈ E * D (since x uv > 0) and so α u +α v = c x (u, v) by constraint (2). Thus α u +α v ≤ 0, i.e., α u ≤ −α v ≤ 1. Let u ∈ U * . We know that x e = 0 for each edge e ∈ δ * (u) by (4). Thus x leaves all vertices in U * totally unmatched. Also, e∈δ * (u) x e = 1 for all u ∈ (A ∪ B) \ U * by (5). So x fully matches every vertex in
Form an array X u of length 1 as follows: if x uv > 0 then there is a cell of length x uv in X u with entry v in it. The entries in X u will be sorted in increasing order of preference for u ∈ A \ U * and in decreasing order of preference for u ∈ B. This was the order used in [38] to prove the integrality of the stable matching polytope. We will now reorder X u as done in [24] .
X a T a
Increasing order of a's preference 1 − q a q a 1 − q a q a incr. order For any a ∈ A \ U * , the initial or least preferred q a = (1 + α a )/2 fraction of X a will be called the positive or blue sub-array of X a and the remaining part, which is the most preferred 1 − q a = (1 − α a )/2 fraction of X a , will be called the negative or red sub-array of X a . The array X a will be reordered as shown in Fig. 2 , i.e., the positive and negative sub-arrays of X a are swapped. Call the reordered array T a .
X b
Decreasing order of b's preference A similar transformation from X b to T b was shown in [24] for each b ∈ B. The initial or most preferred 1 − q b = (1 − α b )/2 fraction of X b will be called the negative or red sub-array of X b and the remaining part, which is the least preferred q b = (1 + α b )/2 fraction of X b , will be called the positive or blue sub-array of X b . As before, swap the positive and negative sub-arrays of X b and call this reordered array T b (see Fig. 3 ).
We will build a table T of width 1 with |(A ∪ B) \ U * | rows: one row for each vertex u ∈ (A ∪ B) \ U * ; in particular, u's row will be the above reordered array T u . We will now decompose the table T into dominant matchings so that x is a convex combination (of the characteristic vectors) of these matchings. As done in [38] , for any t
-let L(t) be the vertical line at distance t from the left boundary of T ; -for each u ∈ (A ∪ B) \ U * : L(t) intersects (or touches the left boundary of) some cell in T u ; call this cell
Claim 2 ([24]) M t is a matching in
The proof of Claim 2, which is based on constraint (2), is given in Appendix B. In particular, this shows that for all a ∈ A \ U * and b ∈ B:
. Corresponding to matching M t , let us define the function f t : A ∪ B → {0, ±1} as follows. An important property that is used in the definition of f t is that for each u ∈ (A ∪ B) \ U * , every cell in the array T u is monochromatic: it is either blue or red.
We will now show that (x, α) is a convex combination of (I Mt , f t ) for t = 0, . . . , d (for some d < m + n), where each M t is a dominant matching and f t is the function f t viewed as an n-tuple.
To obtain the matchings M 0 , M 1 , . . ., as done in [38] , sweep a vertical line from the left boundary of table T to its right boundary: whenever the line hits the left wall of one or more new cells, a new matching is obtained. If the left wall of the i-th leftmost cell(s) in the table T is at distance t i from the left boundary of T , then we obtain the matching M i = M ti defined analogous to the matching M t above.
Let M 0 , M 1 , . . . , M d be all the matchings obtained by sweeping a vertical line through the table T . So
Proof. For any u ∈ U * , we have f i (u) = 0 for all i; also α u = 0 by constraint (4). Thus the claimed equality holds in the coordinates corresponding to u ∈ U * . Consider any u ∈ (A ∪ B) \ U * : we need to evaluate
, where t 0 = 0 and t d+1 = 1.
Observe that t i+1 −t i is the length of the cell T u [t i ]: if this cell is red, then t i+1 −t i is scaled by f i (u) = −1 and if this cell is blue, then t i+1 − t i is left as it is (since f i (u) = 1). So i (t i+1 − t i ) · f i (u) is the difference between the lengths of blue sub-array and red sub-array in T u .
Recall that the length of blue sub-array in T u is q u = (1 + α u )/2 and the the length of red sub-array in T u is 1 − q u = (1 − α u )/2. So we have:
Thus (x, α) is a convex combination of (I M0 , f 0 ), . . . , (I M d , f d ) Proof. We have f i (u) ∈ {±1} for every vertex u ∈ (A ∪ B) \ U * (these are popular vertices) and f i (u) = 0 for every vertex u ∈ U * (these are unpopular vertices). In order to prove f i is a witness of M i , we need to show the following: (see Section 2 for the definition of wt Mi )
u∈A∪B f i (u) = 0. Observe that f i (u) ≥ wt Mi (u, u) for all vertices u. So once we show the above 2 properties, it follows from Theorem 5 that M i is a popular matching with f i as a witness, in fact, a dominant witness. Then we can use Theorem 7 to conclude that M i is a dominant matching in G * .
Property 1.
We will first show this property holds for all edges incident to a ∈ U * . That is,
The vertex a is left unmatched in every dominant matching in G * . So every dominant edge e incident to b must be between b and a neighbor that b prefers to a-otherwise the popularity of the matching that contains e would be violated. Thus b prefers its partner in M i to a and so wt Mi (a, b) = 0.
Recall that (x, α) ∈ C and we have α a + α b ≥ c x (a, b) = 1 and we also have α a = 0; hence α b = 1. That is, the entire array T b is positive or blue, so
Property 1 for all edges (a, b) ∈ (A\U * )×B was originally proved in [24] and we give a simple description below. Consider constraint (1) corresponding to edge (a, b): substitute c x (a, b) = b ≺ab x ab − b a b x ab + a ≺ b a x a b − a b a x a b and substitute α u = 2q u − 1 for u ∈ {a, b}. Recall that q u is the length of the blue subarray in the array T u , for u ∈ {a, b}. We also have e∈δ * (u) x e = 1 for u ∈ {a, b}. Post-substitution and simplification, constraint (1) becomes:
Constraint (11) tells us that the sum of lengths of cells where (i) a is matched to a partner worse than b, (ii) b is matched to a partner worse than a, and (iii) a is matched to b (if such a cell exists) is at most the sum of lengths of the blue sub-arrays in T a and T b . See Fig. 4 where the lengths q a and q b are indicated.
The vertical line in Fig. 4 with the arrow "a's incr. order" next to it indicates the start of a's increasing order of preference among its partners in x and this wraps around. Similarly, the vertical line in Fig. 4 with the arrow "b's incr. order" next to it indicates the start of b's increasing order of preference among its partners in x and this wraps around-note that the orientation of increasing order of preference in T b is from right to left. The following conclusion can be immediately drawn from constraint (11):
-if one of a, b is matched in M i to a partner worse than or equal to the other, then either the cell T a [t i ] or the cell T b [t i ] is in its blue sub-array.
It also follows from constraint (11) that if the blue sub-arrays in T a and T b do not overlap then there are no vertically aligned cells in T a and T b where both a and b are matched to partners worse than the other. Suppose the blue sub-arrays in T a and T b overlap, i.e., q a + q b > 1 as shown in Fig. 4 .
It is easy to check that constraint (11) In order to conclude the proof of Theorem 9, it suffices to show the following. Proof. We know that β u ∈ {0, ±1} for all vertices u. Also the constraints in (4) and (5) are satisfied by every dominant witness β and every dominant matching M . We now claim that M and β also satisfy constraints (1) and (2), i.e., the following two sets of constraints:
where E * D is the set of dominant edges in G * . The function c M is the same as the function c x with the characteristic vector of M in place of x. So for a ∈ A \ U * and b ∈ B where (a, b) ∈ E, we have c M (a, b) ∈ {0, ±2} and for a ∈ U * , c M (a, b) = 1 for all neighbors b. We extend c M to self-loops as c M (u, u) = 0 for u ∈ U * and c M (u, u) = −1 for u ∈ (A ∪ B) \ U * . Consider the max-weight perfect matching LP in the graph G * with self-loops and with edge weight function c M . This is the same as LP1 with c M replacing c x . For any perfect matching N in G * , the objective function evaluates to φ G * (N, M ) − φ G * (M, N ) + k N , where k N is the number of vertices in U * that are matched in N .
Observe that β is a feasible solution to the dual LP (see LP2) since β is a witness of M and for any edge (a, b) where a ∈ U * , we have β a +β b = 1 = c M (a, b) ; the dual objective function evaluates to u∈A∪B β u = 0. The optimal value of the primal LP is at least
Thus β is an optimal solution to the dual LP. In fact, every dominant matching in G * is an optimal solution to the primal LP. The constraints on the left in (12) are dual feasibility constraints and the constraints on the right in (12) are complementary slackness conditions. Thus (I M , β) ∈ C.
Proof of Theorem 8. The constraints α a ≥ −1 for all a ∈ U A \ U * are valid inequalities for C, thus C ∩ {α a = −1 : a ∈ U A \ U * } defines a face of C. This face is exactly the polytope F. Since C is integral, so is F. Every extreme point of F has the form (I N , γ) where N is a dominant matching and γ is a dominant witness of N along with the extra condition that γ a = −1 for a ∈ U A \ U * . Thus N is an extra-dominant matching (see Definition 4) and γ is an extra-dominant witness of N .
Since (I M , β) ∈ C for every dominant matching M and every dominant witness β of M , we have (I N , γ) ∈ F for every extra-dominant matching N and every extra-dominant witnes γ of N . Thus F is an extended formulation of the extra-dominant matching polytope of G * .
Hardness of finding a min-cost quasi-popular matching
We prove Theorem 3 in this section. We will show a reduction from 3SAT. Given a 3SAT formula ψ on n variables, we will perform a simple transformation of ψ so that the transformed formula has a unique occurrence of each negative literal. This property will be useful and is easily accomplished as follows: let X 1 , . . . , X n be the n variables in ψ. For each i, replace all occurrences of ¬X i in ψ with X n+i , i.e., a single new variable. The clauses X i ∨ X n+i and ¬X i ∨ ¬X n+i are added to capture ¬X i ⇐⇒ X n+i . So if the original formula ψ was
, where C 1 , . . . , C m are the original m clauses with negated literals substituted by new variables and for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, C m+i is the clause X i ∨ X n+i and D m+n+i is the clause ¬X i ∨ ¬X n+i .
Our reduction. At a high level, the construction of our instance G ψ resembles the structure of the instance used in [9] to show the hardness of deciding if a marriage instance admits a stable matching that is also dominant. However, our proof is much more involved, and requires the introduction of new tools. In fact, the hardness reductions from [9] heavily rely on the combinatorial characterizations of stable/popular matchings in terms of certain forbidden induced structures. As mentioned in Section 1, such a characterization is not known for quasi-popular matchings. We therefore first devise an understanding of witnesses for quasi-popular matchings (see the discussion terminating in Lemma 7) and then use it for our reduction. The graph G ψ is essentially the parallel composition of clause gadgets, all sharing exactly two vertices s and t. A positive clause gadget corresponds to one of the C i 's and a negative clause gadget corresponds to one of the D i 's.
Each clause gadget is a series composition of literal gadgets. The gadgets corresponding to positive literals and negative literals are different and these are included in Fig. 5 . There will be a pair of consistency edges (the pair (b r , c r ) and (a r , d r ) in Fig. 5 ) between the gadget of variable r ∈ {X 1 , . . . , X 2n } in any clause and the gadget of ¬r. 6 shows how a gadget that corresponds to a positive clause with 3 literals looks like and Fig. 7 shows how a gadget that corresponds to a negative clause looks like.
We now describe the preference lists of vertices in a positive clause C = x ∨ y ∨ z (see Fig. 6 ). We first describe the preference lists of vertices u , v , and u , v , and u , v . The endpoints of consistency edges will be marked in red while endpoints of link edges such as (s, u ) will be in blue.
b y a x a y a z Fig. 6 . A clause gadget corresponding to a positive clause C = x ∨ y ∨ z. The endpoints of this path, i.e., s and t, are common to all clauses. The bold edges will have cost 0 while the dashed edges will have cost 1.
Thus u has 2 neighbors: v (top choice) and s (second choice). Other preference lists are analogous. Recall that we assumed x to be the first literal in this clause. We next describe the preference lists of the 4 vertices a x , b x , a x , b x that occur in x's gadget in the -th clause.
The vertices c x and d x will occur in the gadget of ¬x, which is in the k-th clause of ψ (see Fig. 5 ). Recall that we assumed y to be the second literal in this clause. Below are the preference lists of the 4 vertices a y , b y , a y , b y that occur in y's gadget in the -th clause.
We assumed z to be the third literal in this clause and the preference lists of the 4 vertices a z , b z , a z , b z that occur in z's gadget in the -th clause are given below.
The preference lists of s and t are arbitrary (they do not matter for our arguments). The preference lists of vertices that occur in a clause gadget with 2 positive literals will be totally analogous to the preference lists of vertices in a clause gadget with 3 positive literals (see Fig. 6 ). In more detail, the edge (u , v ) will be missing and so will the third literal gadget. In particular, the vertex t will be adjacent to the b-vertex in the gadget of the second literal and t will be the last choice of this b-vertex.
We will now describe the preference lists of vertices in a negative clause k-the overall picture here (see Fig. 7 ) will be the mirror image of a clause gadget with 2 positive literals. For a gadget D k = ¬x ∨ ¬y, we have: 0  1  1  1  00  00  00  11  11  11  0  0  0  1  1  1  00  00  00  11  11  11  00  00  00  11  11  11  0  0  0  1  1  1  0  0  0  1  1  1  0  0  1  1  00  00  11  11  0  0  0  1  1  1   0  0  0  1  1  1  0  0  0  1  1  1  00  00  11  11  0  0  1 Fig. 7 . A clause gadget corresponding to a negative clause D k = ¬x ∨ ¬y: every negative clause has only 2 literals.
We describe below the preference lists of the 4 vertices c x , d x , c x , d x that occur in the first literal gadget in the k-th clause, which is ¬x's gadget.
The vertices b i , b j , . . . , b in c x 's preference list are the b-vertices in the x-gadgets in various clauses. The order among these vertices in c x 's preference list is not important. Similarly, a i , a j , . . . , a in d x 's preference list are the a -vertices in the gadgets of x that occur in various clauses and the order among these is not important.
We describe next the preference lists of the 4 vertices c y , d y , c y , d y that occur in the second literal gadget in the k-th clause, which is ¬y's gadget.
Edge costs. For each edge e in G ψ , we will set cost(e) ∈ {0, 1}.
-Set cost(e) = 0 where e is any of the u-v, u -v , and u -v edges.
-For each variable r ∈ {X 1 , . . . , X 2n }: set cost(e) = 0 where e is any of the 4 edges in a gadget of r or any of the 4 edges in the gadget of ¬r. -For all other edges e, set cost(e) = 1.
In particular, for all edges e incident to s and t, we have cost(e) = 1. Similarly, for any edge e in the consistency pair for any variable, we have cost(e) = 1. In our figures (5, 6, and 7) all dashed edges have cost 1 and the bold edges have cost 0.
From min-cost quasi-popular matchings to satisfying assignments
This is the easy side of the reduction. Suppose G ψ admits a quasi-popular matching of cost 0. We will show that ψ admits a satisfying assignment.
Lemma 5. Let M be any quasi-popular matching in G ψ with cost(M ) = 0. Then M contains all u-v, u -v , and u -v edges. For any r ∈ {X 1 , . . . , X 2n }, we have: 1 . From a gadget of r (say, on vertices a r , b r , a r , b r ), either (i) (a r , b r ), (a r , b r ) are in M or (ii) (a r , b r ), (a r , b r ) are in M .
-If (i) happens, we say that r is in true state. If (ii) happens, we say that r is in false state.
From a gadget of ¬x (the vertices are
-If (i) happens, we say that ¬r is in true state. If (ii) happens, we say that ¬r is in false state. 3. r and ¬r cannot be simultaneously in true state.
Proof. Since cost(M ) = 0, M is forbidden to use any edge other than the u-v edges, u -v edges, the u -v edges, and the 4 edges in the gadget of any literal. Moreover, since M is quasi-popular, M cannot leave two adjacent vertices unmatched. Thus M contains all u-v, u -v edges, and u -v edges; similarly, points 1 and 2 follow.
The preferences of the vertices are set such that if both (a r , b r ) and (c r , d r ) are in M then the alternating cycle ρ = a r − b r − c r − d r − a r (see Fig. 5) has a blocking edge (b r , c r 
Lemma 6. If G ψ has a quasi-popular matching M with cost(M ) = 0 then ψ is satisfiable.
Proof. Lemma 5 indicates a natural way of defining an assignment for ψ using a matching M with cost 0 and unpopularity factor at most 2. For any variable r ∈ {X 1 , . . . , X 2n } consider the edges in ¬r's gadget that are in M . If (c r , d r ), (c r , d r ) are in M then set r = false else set r = true.
Lemma 5 tells us that when r = false then for every clause i that r is present in, the edges (a r,i , b r,i ) and (a r,i , b r,i ) from r's gadget in the i-th clause are in M (where a r,i , b r,i , a r,i , b r,i are the 4 vertices from r's gadget in the i-th clause). We now need to show that every clause has at least one literal set to true. Suppose not. We have 3 cases here. 1 . Let C i = x ∨ y ∨ z. Suppose x, y, z are in false state. Consider the following alternating path ρ wrt M : Consider the following alternating path ρ wrt M :
In the election between M ⊕ ρ and M , the 7 vertices s, v j , a x,j , b x,j , v j , a y,j , and t vote for M ⊕ ρ while the 3 vertices u , u j , and b y,j vote for M . Thus φ(M ⊕ ρ, M ) = 7 and φ(M, M ⊕ ρ) = 3. Hence u(M ) ≥ 7/3 contradicting that u(M ) ≤ 2. 3. Let D k = ¬x ∨ ¬y. Suppose both ¬x and ¬y are in false state. Consider the following alternating path ρ wrt M :
In the election between M ⊕ ρ and M , the 7 vertices s, d x , u k , c y , d y , u k , and t vote for M ⊕ ρ while the 3 vertices c x , v k , and
From satisfying assignments to min-cost quasi-popular matchings
Theorem 10 shows the other direction of the reduction to complete our proof of correctness. This is the tougher side of the reduction.
Theorem 10. If ψ is satisfiable then G ψ admits a quasi-popular matching M with cost(M ) = 0.
In order to prove Theorem 10, we will construct a witness that will certify a matching M to be a quasipopular matching, i.e., u(M ) ≤ 2.
Our witness. Let G = (A ∪ B, E) be a marriage instance and let M be any matching in G. Recall the edge labels in {(±, ±)} from Section 2. Based on these labels, we will now define an edge weight function g M in G as follows:
Note that in the above edge weight function, a vote of "−" gets scaled by a factor of 2 to become a -2 while a vote of "+" remains a +1. This is because in an election between M and a rival matching, a "−" is a vote for M and against the rival matching while a "+" is a vote for the rival matching Also, g M (e) = 0 for all e ∈ M since both vertices vote "0" for each other: both endpoints of e are indifferent between M and the rival matching since each of them gets assigned the same partner in both the matchings.
LetG be the graph G augmented with self-loops, i.e., each vertex is assumed to be its own last choice neighbor. Thus any matching M in G becomes a perfect matchingM inG by including self-loops at all vertices left unmatched in M . The edge weight function g M can be extended to self-loops as well:
Thus g M is an edge weight function inG and the following claim is easy to show.
Claim 6 For any matching
Thus a matching M in G satisfies u(M ) ≤ 2 if and only if every perfect matching inG with edge weight function g M has weight at most 0. Consider the max-weight perfect matching LP inG = (A ∪ B,Ẽ): this is LP3 given below in variables x e for e ∈Ẽ = E ∪ {(u, u) : u ∈ A ∪ B}. The linear program LP4 is the dual of LP3. The dual variables are α u for u ∈ A ∪ B.
Given a matching M , if we can show α ∈ R n that is a feasible solution of LP4 such that u∈A∪B α u = 0, then the optimal value of LP3 is at most 0, so φ(N, M ) − 2φ(M, N ) ≤ 0 for all N , i.e., u(M ) ≤ 2. Let us call such a vector α a witness for quasi-popularity. Interestingly, every quasi-popular matching admits a simple witness as shown below.
Lemma 7. If M is a quasi-popular matching in G then it has a witness α ∈ {0, ±1, ±2} n .
Proof. Since M is quasi-popular, the optimal value of LP3 is at most 0 and soM is an optimal solution to LP3 (because g M (M ) = 0). Since G is bipartite, the constraint matrix of LP4 is totally unimodular. Thus LP4 has an integral optimal solution α. We have α u ≥ g M (u, u) ≥ −2 for all u.
Complementary slackness implies that α u + α v = g M (u, v) = 0 for each edge (u, v) ∈ M . Thus α u = −α v ≤ 2 for every vertex u matched in M . Regarding any vertex u left unmatched in M , we have (u, u) ∈M , so α u = g M (u, u) = 0 (by complementary slackness). Hence α ∈ {0, ±1, ±2} n .
Proof of Theorem 10. There is a natural way of constructing the matching M in our instance G ψ : include all u-v, u -v , and u -v edges. We will use the satisfying assignment for ψ to choose edges from each literal gadget. For any variable r ∈ {X 1 , . . . , X 2n }: It is easy to see that cost(M ) = 0. We will now show a witness α ∈ {0, ±1, ±2} n that proves that u(M ) ≤ 2. Since s and t are unmatched in M , we will set α s = α t = 0. This will ensure that α u ≥ g M (u, u) for all vertices u since α v = 0 = g M (v, v) for v ∈ {s, t} while α u ≥ −2 = g M (u, u) for all vertices u matched in M .
We will now set α-values for the vertices matched in M . Consider any negative clause, say D k = ¬x ∨ ¬y. Note that a satisfying assignment sets exactly one of x, y to be true (this is by our transformation of the formula ψ: if x = X i then y = X n+i = ¬X i ). Thus we have two cases here: either (i) x = true and y = false, or (ii) x = false and y = true.
Let As shown below, it is easy to check that all intra-gadget edges (those with both endpoints in D k ) are covered by the above assignment of α-values, i.e., α p + α q ≥ g M (p, q) for every edge (p, q).
-The edges (u k , v k ) and (u k , v k ) are covered. Similarly, the edges in the 4-cycles of gadgets of ¬x and ¬y are covered: for any such edge e, we have g M (e) ∈ {−1, 0} and sum of α-values of endpoints of e is 0. -When ¬x = false, the edge (c x , d x ) ∈ M and so g M (d x , u k ) = 2 and we have α dx = α u k = 1. Then ¬y = true, the edges (c y ,
It is easy to see that these edges are covered.
The corner edges (those incident to s and t) are covered in all cases.
We also have several consistency edges with one endpoint in D k : we will first assign α-values to vertices in positive clauses and then Claim 8 below shows that consistency edges are also covered.
Consider any positive clause, say C i = x ∨ y ∨ z with 3 literals. We have three cases here: (i) x = true, (ii) x = false and y = true, (iii) x = y = false and z = true.
Let a x , b x , a x , b x be the 4 vertices in x's gadget, let a y , b y , a y , b y be the 4 vertices in y's gadget, and let a z , b z , a z , b z be the 4 vertices in z's gadget. 1 . In case (i) (so x = true): set α ui = α vi = 0; set α ax = α a x = −1 and α bx = α b x = 1.
-Set α u i = −2 and α v i = 2. Here y could be either true or false: in either case, set α ay = α a y = α by = α b y = 0. -Set α u i = −1 and α v i = 1. Here z could be either true or false: if z = true then set α az = α a z = α bz = α b z = 0, else set α az = α a z = 1 and α bz = α b z = −1. 2. In case (ii) (so x = false): set α ui = −1 and α vi = 1; set α ax = α a x = 1 and α bx = α b x = −1.
-Set α u i = α v i = 0. Here y = true: set α ay = α a y = α by = α b y = 0.
-Set α u i = −1 and α v i = 1. Here z could be either true or false: if z = true then set α az = α a z = α bz = α b z = 0, else set α az = α a z = 1 and α bz = α b z = −1. 3. In case (iii) (so x = false): set α ui = −1 and α vi = 1; set α ax = α a x = 1 and α bx = α b x = −1.
-Set α u i = α v i = 0. Here y = false: set α ay = α a y = 2 and α by = α b y = −2.
-Set α u i = 1 and
See Fig. 10 for the assignment of α-values in case (iii). In the 3 cases above, it is easy to check that all edges in the 4-cycles corresponding to literal gadgets are covered by the above assignment of α-values. Similarly, the u-v, u -v , u -v edges are covered and the corner edges (those incident to s and t) are also covered.
Claim 7 Every link edge is also covered in the 3 cases given above.
Proof. Consider case (i): here the edges
Regarding the other two literal gadgets:
Consider case (ii): here the edge (a x , b x ) ∈ M . So the edge (a x , v i ) is a blocking edge to M and we have α ax = α vi = 1.
-We have the edges (a y , b y ) and
to check that all these edges are covered.
Consider case (iii): here the edges (a x , b x ) and (a y , b y ) are in M . So both (a x , v i ) and (a y , v i ) are blocking edges to M . We have α ax = α vi = 1 and α ay = 2 and α v i = 0. So the blocking edges are covered.
-We also have g M (b x , u i ) = g M (b y , u i ) = −1 and we set α bx = −1, α u i = 0 along with α by = −2, α u i = 1.
Thus these edges are covered. -Finally, g M (a z , v i ) = −1 and we set α az = 0 and α v i = −1. Thus all link edges are covered.
For a positive clause with 2 literals, note that only cases (i) and (ii) listed above would occur and the same proof (see Claim 7 and the discussion before that) shows that all edges are covered.
Claim 8 shows that consistency edges are also covered. Thus α is a feasible solution to LP4. Moreover, w α w = 0 since for each edge (p, q) ∈ M , we have α p + α q = 0, also α s = α t = 0. This finishes the proof of Theorem 10.
Claim 8 For any variable r, the consistency edges between r's gadget and ¬r's gadget are covered.
Proof. Suppose r = false in this assignment. Then we have α cr = 1 and α d r = −1. We always have α br ≥ −2. Note that g M (b r , c r ) = −1, so the edge (b r , c r ) is covered by the sum of α-values of its endpoints. It is easy to check that, by construction of α-values, when r = false, we have α a r ≥ 0. Similarly, g M (a r , d r ) = −1, so the edge (a r , d r ) is also covered.
Suppose r = true in this assignment. Then we have α cr = −1 and α d r = 1. We always have α a r ≥ −2 (in fact, we have α a r ≥ −1), thus α a r + α d r ≥ −1 = g M (a r , d r ). It is easy to check that when r = true, we have
This finishes the proof of correctness of our reduction. Thus we have proved Theorem 3 stated in Section 1.
Lower bounds on the extension complexity
Given polytopes P 1 ⊆ R k , P 2 ⊆ R and an affine map f : R → R k such that f (P 2 ) = P 1 , we say that P 2 is an extension of P 1 . The number of facets of P 2 (or equivalently, the number of inequalities in a minimal description that are not valid at equality) is its size, and the minimum size of an extension of P 1 is the extension complexity of P 1 , denoted by xc(P 1 ).
We now prove Theorem 4. Our starting point is the following lower bound on the extension complexity of the independent set polytope. Let I H be the independent set polytope of a graph H.
Theorem 11 ([18]
). There exists an (explicitly constructed) family of graphs H = (V, E) with bounded degree such that xc(I H ) = 2 Ω(|V |/ log |V |) .
Given a SAT formula ψ on n variables, let C(ψ) be the convex hull of all vectors x ∈ {0, 1} n such that ψ(x) = 1 where, as usual, for i ∈ [n], x i = 1 corresponds to the i-th variable being set to true. It is now easy to construct a family of 2SAT instances ψ with n variables and O(n) clauses such that xc(C(ψ)) = 2 Ω(n/ log n) : indeed, every independent set instance H = (V, E) can be formulated as a 2SAT instance ψ with n = |V | variables x 1 , . . . , x n and clauses (¬x i ∨ ¬x j ) iff (i, j) ∈ E. Since the hard instances from Theorem 11 have bounded degree, the number of clauses in the 2SAT instances we create is linear in the number of variables. Now apply the sequence of reductions from Section 5, transforming the 2SAT instance ψ with n variables and Θ(n) clauses into an equivalent 2SAT instance with Θ(n) variables and clauses, and then defining the min-cost quasi-popular matching instance G ψ on Θ(n) vertices and Θ(n) edges defined in Section 5. The reduction from Section 5 assumed that ψ was a 3SAT instance but it clearly applies to a 2SAT instance as well.
Recall the edge cost function cost defined in Section 5. Consider the following face of the quasi-popular matching polytope: F = {z ∈ Q : cost(z) = 0}. Our goal is to define a linear surjective map h from the face F defined above to C(ψ). Hence, given an extended formulation T for Q, we obtain that
Therefore, a "small" extended formulation for Q would imply the existence of a "small" extended formulation for C(ψ). The lower bound on the extension complexity of C(ψ) will therefore imply the claimed bound.
We will need the following properties proved in Section 5:
1. Let M be a matching that belongs to F . Thus cost(M ) = 0. Let S be the following true/false assignment to the variables in ψ. For i ∈ [n]:
S(x i ) = false if (c i , d i ) ∈ M ; true otherwise.
It follows from Lemma 6 that S satisfies ψ. 2. Let S be a satisfying assignment for ψ. As given in the proof of Theorem 10, there is a matching M ∈ F with the following properties:
for i ∈ [n] : (c i , d i ) ∈ M ⇐⇒ S(x i ) = false.
Define the mapping h from F to C(ψ) as: for z ∈ F , let h(z) = x where x i = 1 − z((c i , d i )) for i ∈ [n]. Part 1 above implies that, if z is a vertex of F , then h(z) is a satisfying assignment. Together with part 2, we deduce h(F ) = C(ψ).
Thus we can conclude that xc(Q) ≥ 2 Ω( n log n ) . Since the number of edges of G ψ is Θ(n), the bound follows. The lower bound on xc(P) is analogous to the above proof. For this lower bound, we will use a result from [9] that shows the NP-hardness of finding a min-size popular matching in a marriage instance that is not stable. The details are given in Appendix C. * if u ∈ A then set α u = −1 else set α u = 1; -else [so there is no M -alternating path in G M between u and any unmatched vertex in A] * if u ∈ A then set α u = 1 else set α u = −1.
Thus α u ∈ {±1} for every vertex u matched in M and α u = 0 for all unmatched vertices u. We will now show that α is a valid witness for M . Observe that α a + α b = 0 for each (a, b) ∈ M since for each edge (a, b) ∈ M , there is an M -alternating path in G M between a and some unmatched vertex u in A if and only if there is an M -alternating path in G M between b and u. Also α v = 0 for each unmatched vertex v; thus we have u∈A∪B α u = 0. It is easy to see that α u ≥ wt M (u, u) for each u ∈ A ∪ B. What is non-trivial to show is that every edge (a, b) ∈ E is covered, i.e., α a + α b ≥ wt M (a, b).
Missing details from Section 4.1. We now describe the marriage instance G that corresponds to our 2SAT formula ψ. This construction is from [9] where it was used to show the hardness of finding a popular matching that is not dominant. We give here an overview of this construction, and refer to [9, Section 4] for details.
G is the series composition of a starting edge (s, u 0 ), a gadget for each clause i, and a final edge (v k , t). The gadget for clause i starts with vertex v i−1 and ends with vertex u i and contains the parallel composition of disjoint gadgets Z i,j for each literal j in clause i. See Fig. 11 . Each gadget corresponding to a positive literal will be connected through a consistency edge to the corresponding negative literal. Fig. 11 . The high-level picture of the instance G.
Preference lists are defined such that for the 2SAT instance from Section 4.1, there is a bijection π between satisfying assignments and matchings in S (see Section 4.1 for a definition). Each S ∈ S, when restricted to a literal gadget, coincides with one of two possible sets of edges. We say therefore that S induces either a true state or a false state in the gadget. For each variable X i , the mapping π is such that the gadget of X i is in true state if and only if the gadget of ¬X i is in false state if and only if X i = true in the corresponding assignment. By Theorem 6, for each matching S ∈ S, there is an S-augmenting path in G S . The following stronger property holds here.
Claim 9 ([9])
Let S ∈ S. Then there is exactly one S-augmenting path ρ in G S . The path ρ goes from s to t, does not use any consistency edge, and passes in each clause gadget through a literal gadget that is in true state.
An important property maintained by the vertex preference lists is that for any satisfying stable matching S, if the corresponding assignment sets X to false then the edge v i−1 → Z i,j (where i = /2 and j = 1 if is odd else j = 2) would be labeled (−, −) and thus it would not belong to the graph G S . This property along with Claim 9 allows us to conclude the following properties used in Section 4.1.
-Property (a) follows from the bijection π between satisfying assignments and matchings S ∈ S.
-Property (b) follows from Claim 9 and by the fact that, for every clause, in every satisfying assignment to the instance, there is exactly one literal set to true. -Property (c) follows from the fact that distinct assignments differ in the value of at least one variable.
-Property (d) follows from the fact that sets ρ S \ S differ in at least one of the edges e of the form v i−1 → Z i,j , since e ∈ ρ S implies that ρ S traverses the gadget of the j-th literal in clause i, hence this literal is set to true; we know that no two satisfying assignments set exactly the same literals to true.
Appendix C: Missing details from Section 6
We will now show a lower bound on the extension complexity of the popular matching polytope, i.e., xc(P) ≥ 2 Ω(m/ log m) . As mentioned earlier, it was shown in [9] that it is NP-hard to decide if a marriage instance G admits a stable matching that is also dominant. An easy adaptation of this reduction shows that it is NP-hard to decide if G admits a min-size popular matching that is not stable. We give an overview of this reduction and refer to [9, Section 5.2] for the details.
We will first outline the instance G used to show the hardness of finding a stable matching that is dominant. This reduction closely resembles the reduction from [9] outlined in Appendix B to show the hardness of deciding if a marriage instance admits a popular matching that is not dominant.
The 2SAT formula ψ from Section 6 is transformed as done in Section 5 so that there is a unique occurrence of any negative literal. G is the union of a gadget per clause. These clause gadgets are vertexdisjoint, with the exception of vertices s and t, which are common to all of them. Each clause gadget is the series composition of u 0 , one gadget per literal of the clause, and v 2 . See Fig. 12. 00 00 00 11 11 11 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 00 00 00 11 11 11 0 0 0 1 1 1 00 00 00 11 11 11 00 00 00 11 11 11 00 00 00 11 11 11 s u 0 v 0 Z ,1 u 1 v 1 Z ,2 u 2 v 2 t Fig. 12 . The high-level picture of the gadget corresponding to clause with two literals. The vertices s and t are common to all clauses.
As before, each gadget corresponding to a positive literal will be connected through a consistency edge to the (unique) corresponding negative literal and every stable matching induces a true state or false state in each literal gadget. Preference lists are set such that the following claim holds.
Claim 10 ( [9] ) Let S be a stable matching in G. If there is an augmenting path ρ in G S , then ρ goes from s to t, does not use any consistency edge, and passes through all the literals in some clause and each of these literals is in false state. Conversely, if in each clause there is a literal in true state, then there is no augmenting path in G S .
The instance G used to show the hardness of finding a min-size popular matching that is not stable is virtually the same as the instance G described above-the main difference is that the above instance G is augmented with a square t, t , r , r at one end as shown in Fig. 13 . Restricted to these 4 vertices, the preferences are: r is the top choice of both r and t while r is the top choice of both r and t . There is also a new vertex w that is a neighbor of all negative literal gadgets. Note that G has Θ(n) edges and vertices, where n is the number of variables in the original 2SAT instance. 0 0 0 1 1 1 00 00 00 11 11 11 00 00 00 11 11 11 00 00 00 11 11 11 00 00 00 11 11 11 t s r t r Fig. 13 . The new instance G is the old instance G augmented with a square at one end. The shaded cells correspond to literal gadgets. For convenience, consistency edges and vertex w are not indicated here.
The following properties were shown in [9] :
